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NOTES
DEPORTATION AS DE FACTO EXTRADITION:
THE MATTER OF JOSEPH DOHERTY
The British Government wants me back, to punish me for
defending my country against those very troops that terrorize my
neighborhood and my neighbors. Michael Hayes was one of the
many that were mysteriously murdered. Within three months of
Mickey 's death, six more of my neighbors were gunned down in
the same manner. The same coverup, the same injustice, and the
same troops. This is dedicated to the innocent and the forgotten.
-Joseph Doherty1
1. Doherty, Death in the Rain, in Ir. Echo (New York City), Jan. 25, 1986, at 36, col.
1. People unfamiliar with Joseph Doherty's case consider him to be a terrorist. Mr.
Doherty, however, sees himself as a soldier defending his country from the political
oppression and foreign military occupation he describes in this poem. This oppression is
well documented but often ignored in the United States because of our strong ties with the
United Kingdom. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, APPEAL HEARING OF SIX MEN CONVICTED
OF BOMBINGS IN BIRMINGHAM (1988); AMNESTY INT'L, INVESTIGATING LETHAL
SHOOTINGS: THE GIBRALTAR INQUEST (1989); AMNESTY INT'L, NORTHERN IRELAND:
ALLLEGED TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PAUL CARUANA (1985); AMNESTY INT'L,
NORTHERN IRELAND: KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES AND "SUPERGRASS" TRIALS (1988);
AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO NORTHERN
IRELAND (1978).
Northern Ireland is in a state of war, see Finucane v. The Governor of Portlaoise
Prison, No. 164/89, slip op. at 15 (Ir. S.C. Mar. 13, 1990), and is recognized and treated
as such by the United Kingdom. The long history of Irish resistance to English occupation,
which has smoldered and erupted periodically through the centuries, surfaced again in the
1970s after the failure of the Irish civil rights movement. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp.
270, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has led this
resistance, with significant support from the local community. Finucane, No. 164/89, at
14. The United Kingdom has responded with sophisticated counterinsurgency tactics, as
well as special tribunals (Diplock courts) to deal with politically motivated "crimes" and
important changes in the procedural and substantive law for politically motivated "crimes."
Id. See generally R. HARVEY, DIPLOCK AND THE ASSAULT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES (Haldane
Soe'y of Socialist Lawyers Report No. 1, 1981). The English judiciary also recognizes and
characterizes the occupation of Northern Ireland as a war. In Attorney-General for
Northern Ireland's Reference, a British soldier was acquitted of murder because of the, as
Lord Diplock stated, "state of armed and clandestinely organized insurrection against the
lawful government of Her Majesty by persons seeking to gain political ends .... " [1977]
A.C. 105; [1976] N. Ir. 169, 206 (C.A.). The state of war in Northern Ireland
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note will examine the relationship between international
extradition and deportation, and the application of these mechanisms in the
matter of Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty. For the past seven years2 the
United States government has attempted, unsuccessfully, to return Doherty
to the United Kingdom by way of extradition and deportation. Although
never charged with a crime in the United States, Doherty has been
incarcerated throughout this period in the Metropolitan Correctional
Center in New York City.3 His prolonged incarceration is the result of
the United States government's attempt to use deportation to accomplish
what it could not by extradition. This Note will demonstrate that utilizing
deportation to return a criminal to a foreign country is without basis in
law and is inconsistent with the function and rationales underlying
extradition and deportation.'
distinguishes Joseph Doherty from terrorists who rely on violence against civilians to cause
chaos in otherwise peaceful countries.
Furthermore, Doherty's acts do not satisfy the United States government's own
definition of terrorism. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM:
1988 (1989) (terrorism defined and widely accepted by the United States government for
the last twenty years as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets"). Doherty's acts were a direct assault on a British military convoy
and were not directed at civilian targets. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272. Therefore, the
issue is not whether the government's attempted deportation of Doherty is justified as a
response to terrorism, but whether it is justified as a legitimate exercise of the executive
branch's inherent diplomatic power.
This case also has important ramifications for the thousands of refugees who arrive
in this country every year because it concerns the process governing deportation and
asylum. The fairness of this process is a recurring issue in the large number of cases heard
by immigration officials. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Immigration Lawyers
Association at 1, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-4084, 1988 Term;
renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
2. Mr. Doherty was arrested in New York City on June 18, 1983 on an immigration
warrant and has been held without bail since. Somerstein & Pike, Information Statement
on Joseph Doherty (1989) (on file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.).
3. The Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) is a short-term pre-trial detention
facility, exempt from normal federal regulations applicable to long-term facilities. Mr.
Doherty is allowed one hour a day to exercise on the roof, and there are no vocational
programs. Mr. Doherty is the longest held prisoner in the MCC's history. Id. at 4-5.
4. Mr. Doherty is currently awaiting a hearing on asylum mandated by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Sqiers, Plea for Release on Bail by IRA Member Rebuffed,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1990, at 1, col. 3. He was recently denied bail by the District Court,
Southern District of New York. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
In 1981, Joseph Doherty escaped from a British prison where he was
awaiting trial for the murder of a British soldier.5 He subsequently fled
to the United States where he was captured two years later. 6  On
December 12, 1984, the United States government's extradition request
was denied by the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York, because Doherty's acts fell under the political offense exception of
the United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty.7  In blocking
Doherty's return to the United Kingdom, the court characterized his
actions as "the political offense exception in its most classic form."'
Despite affirmation in collateral and appellate review, 9 the executive
branch of the government refused to abide by the word or spirit of the
district court's decision, instead resorting to the immigration process in its
attempt to return Joseph Doherty to the United Kingdom.
The uncertainty concerning when a new Irish extradition law, that
essentially eliminated the political offense exception to extradition between
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, would become operative
caused Joseph Doherty to waive his right to an asylum hearing and agree
to immediate deportation to the Republic of Ireland. " Doherty hoped to
5. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272. Doherty and three members of the PIRA occupied
a residence in Northern Ireland to prepare an ambush of a British army convoy. Id.
British intelligence learned of the plan and dispatched a car of plainclothes British
commandos. Id. During the assault, initiated by the British, a British soldier was killed.
Id. Joseph Doherty was convicted in absentia of murder. id.
6. Id.
7. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Jan. 21, 1977, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T.
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty].
8. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 276.
9. United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 786 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1986). Although no appellate review exists for a denial of extradition, the
government has an absolute right to refile the request. Doherty, 786 F.2d at 495. The
government chose not to refile, instead attempting to circumvent the non-appealability of
an extradition decision by seeking collateral review in the form of a declaratory judgement.
Id. at 493. This attempt was rejected by the district and appellate courts. Id.
10. Brief for Petitioner at 20-21, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No.
88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Tenn). Doherty withdrew his
asylum request based on assurances that the Republic of Ireland would accept him into its
territory. Id. at 15. If Doherty remained in the United States and lost his asylum bid,
subsequent deportation would subject him to the new Extradition (European Convention of
the Suppression of Terrorism) Act of 1987. Id. at 21; see Extradition (European
Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism) Act (Ir. 1987) [hereinafter Irish Extradition
19901
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return to Ireland before the new law took effect and thereby preserve his
political offense defense to extradition. 1' Doherty was faced, or so he
thought, with a choice between immediate deportation (in which case he
would enjoy the possible protection of the Ireland's Extradition Act of
1965)2 or a request for asylum, a process that could have taken years
and subjected him to the new Irish extradition law if unsuccessful.
Doherty chose immediate deportation to the Republic of Ireland. 3
Under 8 U.S.C. section 1253, aliens have a substantive right to
choose their country of deportation. 4  The government, however,
invoked a seldom used provision'5 in section 125316 claiming that
Act of 1987].
11. Implementation of the act was suspended until December I, 1987. The Irish
Parliament retained power to postpone or accelerate its implementation. The law was
enacted on Dec. 1, 1987. Matter of Doherty, Mem. Att'y Gen. (June 30, 1989) at 17-18.
12. See Extradition Act (Ir. 1965).
13. Doherty had every reason to believe that he would be sent to Ireland because the
government had not presented any evidence that his deportation there would prejudice
United States interest. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Immigration Lawyers Association
at 3, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-4084, 1988 Term;
renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
14. See infra note 55.
15. U.S. Refuses to Deport I.R.A. Member, Rarely Used Provision Invoked, NAT'L L.
J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter U.S. Refuses to Deport I.R.A. Member].
According to government officials and Doherty's attorneys, this is the first time that the
government has attempted to use section 1253 to prevent an alien from designating his
country of deportation. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 17, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d
1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
16. 8 U.S.C. sections 1253(a) and 1253(h)(1), (2)(A) and (2)(C) provide:
(a) Acceptance by designated country; deportation upon nonacceptance by
country
The deportation of an alien in the United States provided for in this
chapter, or any other act or treaty, shall be directed by the Attorney
General to a country promptly designated by the alien if that country is
willing to accept him into its territory, unless the Attorney General, in
his discretion, concludes that deportation to such country would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States. No alien shall be
permitted to make more than one such designation. . . . If the govern-
ment of the country designated by the alien fails finally to advise the
Attorney General within three months following original inquiry whether
that government will or will not accept such alien into its territory, such
designation may thereafter be discharged.
(h) Withholding of deportation or return
(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien to a
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deportation to any country other than the United Kingdom, "would
prejudice the interests of the United States." 7 This not only accorded
the government a second chance at returning Doherty to the United
Kingdom, it also substantially limited the judiciary's role in the final
disposition of the case."s Even with the judicial branch effectively
eliminated, the government's effort was nevertheless thwarted by its own
administrative judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which
held that Doherty should be deported to the Republic of Ireland."
The government responded by utilizing 8 C.F.R. section 3.1
(h)(1)(iii) ° which allows the attorney general to review and overturn
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or f edom would be threatened in such country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney
General determines that:
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participat-
ed in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social; group, or political
opinion;
(C) there are serious reason for considering that the alien has
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States
prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States ...
8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a), 1253(h)(I),-(2)(A),-(2)(C) (emphasis added).
17. U.S. Refuses to Deport I.R.A. Member, supra note 15, at 3, col. 1.
18. The court is generally limited to review of discretion and procedural due process
in deportation procedures. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
19. Matter of Doherty, A26-185-231, slip op. (BIA Dec. 3, 1987). The government
did not produce any evidence that Doherty's return to the United Kingdom would prejudice
the interests of the United States despite being granted three adjournments for that express
purpose. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990)
(No. 88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
20. 8 C.F.R. 3.1 (h)(l) provides:
The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all cases
which:
(i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.
(ii) The Chairman or a majority of the Board believes it should be
referred to the Attorney General for review.
(iii) The Commissioner requests be referred to the Attorney General
for review.
(iv) In any case in which the Attorney General reviews the decision
of the Board, the decision of the Attorney General shall be
stated in writing and shall be transmitted to the Board for
transmittal and service provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
1990]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
decisions of the BIA. 2' The attorney general, the losing party through-
out, overturned the BIA decision' and thereby circumvented the
applicable treaty and statute addressed by the district court in the
extradition proceeding,' as well as Doherty's administrative victories in
the deportation proceedings.
Even if ultimately unsuccessful, the government's delay has subjected
Doherty to the new Irish extradition law' as well as the supplemental
Anglo-American extradition treaty.' For this reason, Doherty moved to
reopen his asylum hearing,2 a motion opposed by the government but
nevertheless granted by the BIA.27 The government invoked the attorney
general's review power for an unprecedented second time, denying a
hearing and issuing a final order of deportation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
affirmed the government's designation of the United Kingdom as the
country of deportation but reversed the government's refusal to grant
Doherty a hearing on asylum. 29 By affirming the government's designa
21. In the last twenty years the attorney general has only certified eight cases for
review. All these cases dealt with questions of law and not the extraordinary factual
determination which the attorney general conducted with regard to Doherty. Amicus
Curiae Brief of Members of the United States Congress at 21, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d
1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
22. Matter of Doherty, Mem. Att'y Gen. (June 9, 1988).
23. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 7.
24. Irish Extradition Act of 1987, supra note 10. If Doherty had been deported
immediately it was uncertain whether he would have been extradited by the Republic of
Ireland. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 53-56. Regardless, because Irish law
provides for extraterritorial prosecution, Doherty would have been subject to prosecution
and a ten-year sentence in the Republic of Ireland for his crimes committed in the United
Kingdom. Id. It is likely he will spend a longer period of time incarcerated in the United
States.
25. Supplemental Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Dec. 23, 1986, United
States-United Kingdom [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Supplemental Treaty], reprinted in S. EXEC.
REP. NO. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 app. 1, at 15 (1986). Although not in effect at the
time of Doherty's arrest or deportation, the treaty purports to be retroactive. See infra note
129.
26. 8 C.F.R. section 3.2 requires material evidence not available at prior asylum
hearings to reopen a case. The BIA found that implementation of the Irish Extradition Act
of 1987, supra note 10, the occurrence of which was not certain, fulfilled these criteria.
Matter of Doherty, A26-185-231, slip op. (BIA Nov. 14, 1988).
27. Matter of Doherty, A26-185-231, slip op. (BIA Nov. 14, 1988).
28. Matter of Doherty, Mem. Att'y Gen. (June 9, 1988).
29. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court recently has
agreed to decide whether the government must reconsider Doherty's asylum request. U.S.
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tion, the Court of Appeals suggests that the extradition and deportation are
interchangeable tools of foreign policy. While these mechanisms reflect
certain political and diplomatic interests, they do not allow the government
to subject an individual to political persecution in the name of United
States foreign policy.
I. DEPORTATION AND EXTRADITION: DEFINITIONAL DISTINCTIONS
International extradition returns an individual present in the United
States to a country where the individual is wanted for criminal acts
committed in that country or against its citizens.' Deportation, on the
other hand, removes an alien from the United States because the alien is
undesirable or detrimental to the public welfare.3' Both mechanisms
contain political-humanitarian exceptions to expulsion, if expulsion would
subject the individual to political persecution.3 2 The implementation of
either deportation or extradition should correspond to its proper purpose
and should not frustrate the applicable political-humanitarian exceptions
to expulsion. This Note will demonstrate that the government's use of
deportation to return Joseph Doherty to the United Kingdom is contrary
to the purpose of deportation and the parallel political-humanitarian
exceptions to expulsion contained in deportation and extradition.
First, extradition, not deportation, is the mechanism designated by
Congress to return criminals to foreign countries. Also, extradition,
because of its criminal nature, contains procedural and substantive
safeguards that protect individual liberty. Deportation, on the other hand,
is not designed to return criminals to foreign countries but to protect the
internal welfare of the United States. Therefore, its utilization to return
an alleged criminal to a foreign country circumvents the safeguards
contained in extradition. Second, the motivation and result of the
government's actions render meaningless the judiciary's determination that
Joseph Doherty's acts fell within the political-humanitarian exception to
extradition. These actions attempt to capitalize on the somewhat
ambiguous and often misunderstood functions of deportation and
extradition33 which the following analysis will clarify.
Supreme Court to Review 'Son of Sam' Law, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 29, 1990, at 1, col 5.
30. Helton, Harmonizing Political Asylum and International Extradition, I GEO. IMM.
& INT'L L.J. 457, 457 (1986).
31. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1892).
32. Helton, supra note 30, at 475; see also Pirie, The Need for a Codified Definition
of Persecution in United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1986).
33. Helton, supra note 30, at 458.
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A. Extradition
The United States Supreme Court has defined extradition to foreign
governments as "the surrender of a criminal by a foreign state to which
he has fled from persecution to the state in which the crime was commit-
ted, upon demand of the other state, in order that he may be dealt with
according to its laws. " '
Domestic extradition to foreign governments is not constitutionally
mandated.35 As a result, it is completely subject to a legislative and
executive determination on what procedural and substantive criteria are
required to extradite an individual. The government's treatment of
Doherty violates both the procedural and substantive criteria enacted by
Congress and approved by the executive branch for the extradition of an
alleged criminal to a foreign country.
Congress has elected not to enact a comprehensive statute dealing with
foreign extradition.' Instead, the substantive criteria for extradition are
found in individual extradition treaties between the United States and
various countries.37 Commentators have grouped the interests Congress
weighs in its ratification of a treaty into four categories," any of which
if important enough may limit or broaden the definition of an extraditable
offense. 9 Therefore, in negotiating and ratifying an extradition treaty,
Congress and the executive branch necessarily consider the treaty's risks
and benefits to the United States. Furthermore, these diplomatic interests
are intended to be fully enunciated in the particular treaty and, like the
parole evidence rule, should not thereafter be manipulated by outside
interests not enumerated in, or explicitly excepted from, the treaty.
Congress, however, has established certain minimal standards in the
U.S.C. which are applied consistently regardless of the foreign country
involved.' These procedures provide executive and judicial checks and
34. Fong Yue ing, 149 U.S. at 709.
35. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; see California v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 482 U.S.
400 (1987) (the Extradition Act, which implements the extradition clause of article IV,
requires an asylum state to give up to a demanding state a fugitive against whom a properly
certified indictment has been lodged).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982) is basically procedural in nature.
37. Banoff & Pyle, 'To Surrender Political Offenders': The Political Offense Exception
to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 175 (1984).
38, Id. at 173-74. The classifications include: 1) to obtain reciprocal return of fugitives;
2) to facilitate punishment of wrongful conduct; 3) to avoid harboring those who may
commit similar crimes again; and 4) to avoid international tension caused by the refusal to
return a sought after offender. Id.
39. See Helton, supra note 30, at 459 nn. 100 & 113 (examples of variations in the
political offense exception).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982) (procedure requires judicial and executive approval of
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balances that protect individual rights as well as the diplomatic interests
of the United States. The United States will not extradite someone unless
the criminal activity is enumerated in a valid treaty4 and is generically
criminal under the laws of the United States.42 The United States
government has discretionary power to act on a foreign government's
request to apprehend and deliver an alleged offender to the requesting
country.' The government must then bring the individual before a
federal magistrate or judge who determines whether a valid treaty exists
and whether the crime is extraditable under that treaty." If the court
finds the individual extraditable, the decision is certified and sent to the
secretary of state who has final discretion on whether the extradition will
be enforced.4' The secretary's discretion is limited to approval of an
extradition order and does not allow reversal of a judicial finding of
ineligibility.' This two-tier approach provides checks and balances
between the legal and diplomatic considerations involved in an extradition
request.
By requiring judicial certification based on the terms of a particular
extradition treaty, Congress rejected a general grant of discretion to the
State Department which would have enabled the executive branch to
determine requests based solely on the comity interests of United States
foreign policy.47 Although other nations will extradite based solely on
their political interests,48 the United States has rejected such a practice
because of the due process rights of individuals, a mistrust of foreign
criminal procedure and a fear of overreaching executive power.49
Attempting to deport Joseph Doherty to the United Kingdom based on
his "crime" committed in Northern Ireland after an extradition attempt
extradition).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982); see also Factor v. Laubermcr, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933)
(extradition requires a valid treaty with the requesting country); United States v. Rauseher,
119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886) (crime must be enumerated in the extradition treaty).
42. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922) (crime is extraditable only if it
is criminal in both countries); Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6 (1916); Wright v. Herkel, 190
U.S. 40 (1903) (it is enough if a particular variety of crime is extraditable in both
jurisdictions).
43. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 37, at 176.
44. Id. at 175-76.
45. Id. at 176.
46. Id.; see also Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 37, at 175-77.
48. Id. at 176.
49. Id.
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based on the same incident has been rejected by the judicial branch' is
an obvious attempt to circumvent these minimal procedural safeguards
established by Congress. It also avoids the judicial enforcement of the
substantive criteria contained in the extradition treaty with the United
Kingdom. 51 Although conflicting and potentially detrimental diplomatic
interests exist, there is no legal basis for returning Doherty to the United
Kingdom. Justifying his expulsion on the diplomatic interests of the
United States ignores the fact that these interests were already considered
by the legislative and executive branches when they entered into the
extradition treaty with the United Kingdom.52
B. Deportation
Unlike extradition, deportation depends solely on an alien's effect on
the internal welfare of the United States and not on any diplomatic
agreement between the United States and a foreign country. The Supreme
Court has defined deportation as
the removal of an alien out of this country, simply because his
presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and
without any punishment being imposed or contemplated, either
under the laws of the country out of which he is sent, or those of
the country he is sent to.53
Deportation's prophylactic function is further evidenced by the criteria
for its implementation:
(1) Entry without inspection or through the improper channels;
(2) Institutionalization because of mental illness;
(3) Failure to comply with alien registration;
(4) Membership in groups which pose a danger to the
government or public safety;
(5) Becoming a public charge;
(6) Conviction for crimes of moral turpitude;
(7) Drug addiction or drug related conviction; and
50. See supra note 5.
51. See U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 7. The treaty between the United
States and Great Britain contains a traditional political offense exception. Id. art.
v(1)(c)(i).
52. The provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 3184 and the applicable treaty are rendered
meaningless if the government can obtain the same result at will through deportation.
53. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 725 (1982) (emphasis added).
[Vol. I I
DEPORTATION OR EXTRADITION JOSEPH DOHERTY
(8) Failure to comply with applicable immigration requirements
for aliens.5
As these criteria demonstrate, the political interests of the United
States are not grounds for deportation without some correlation to national
security or welfare. The same is true for the removal of an alien found
to be deportable.
As the primary purpose of the deportation statute is to protect the
internal welfare of the United States, an alien found to be deportable
generally is free to designate the country of deportation.55 The attorney
general may designate the country if the alien refuses to do so or if the
designated country refuses to accept the alien.56 The attorney general's
discretion is limited by the asylum and withholding provisions which
prohibit deportation to a country where the alien faces a well-founded fear
of persecution.5" As deportation focuses on domestic welfare (as
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982); 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982); see Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 26 (1982) ("alien in a deportation hearing has substantive rights . . .he can
(within certain limits) designate the country of deportation, depart voluntarily and avoid the
stigma of deportation"); Rodriguez-Agustin v. INS, 765 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1985)
(alien's right to designate country of deportation is a substantive right); Maldonado-
Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975) (deportable alien is entitled to
various statutory rights including right to designate country of deportation); see also, Brief
for Respondents, INS at 45-46, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-
4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1986) ("deportation and extradition are two entirely different processes having
separate statutory bases. Unlike the subject of an extradition proceeding, a deportee ...
has the right to choose initially the country to which he will be deported. By preserving
this statutory right for Nazi persecutors, Congress made it clear that ... such persons were
to be treated as deportees not extradites") (citations omitted). The government's position
in Linnas appears inapposite to its use of deportation of Joseph Doherty.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
57. 8 U.S.C. section 1158(a) provides that eligibility for a discretionary grant of asylum
if the alien meets the definition of "refugee" contained in 8 U.S.C. section 1 101(a)(42)(A).
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
The term refugee means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in a case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such a person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. .. . The
term refugee does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, to political
opinion.
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opposed to the criminal focus of extradition), judicial review is limited to
procedural due process and abuse of discretion.5"
The above criteria demonstrate that deportation's purpose is to protect
the internal integrity of the United States. Thus, its focus is on the alien's
effect on.the domestic welfare. Moreover, the alien's right to choose his
or her country of deportation is explicit, thereby providing individual
protection that justifies the limited judicial review. This right, combined
with the asylum and withholding exceptions, demonstrates that deportation
was intended to be a diplomatically neutral process that would not be
accomplished at the cost of individual freedom.
IV. POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTIONS TO
EXTRADITION AND DEPORTATION
Both extradition and deportation contain political-humanitarian ex-
ceptions to exclusion.59 The political offense exception applies to
extradition, while its counterpart in the immigration process is found in
the asylum and withholding provisions of 8 U.S.C. sections 1185 and
1253.' Their separate development and application61 might explain
their different criteria, but a number of scholars have argued that the
failure to adequately recognize their relationship has resulted in various
8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (1982). 8 U.S.C. section 1253(h)(1) provides that the attorney
general shall not deport or return any alien "to an area where the aliens life or freedom
would be threatened by persecution." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982); see INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 1407 (1984) (attorney general has no discretion once the alien has met these
criteria); see also Cooper, Promised Land or Land of Broken Promises? Political Asylum
in the United States, 76 KY. L.J. 931 (1987-88) (discussing standards for asylum and
withholding).
58. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540 (1951) ("[Tlhe power to expel aliens, being
essentially a power of the political branches . . . may be exercised entirely through
executory offices with such opportunities for judicial review as Congress may see fit subject
to judicial intervention under the Constitution." The Court based this holding on the fact
that deportation was not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment).
Harisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1951) (deportation is "so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial
inquiry or inference").
59. Helton, supra note 30, at 458, 475.
60. Id. at 475.
61. The political offense exception operates on citizens and aliens wanted in connection
with alleged crimes committed abroad. Id. at 457. Its emergence as a formal legal process
came relatively early in the 19th century. Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political
Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV. 450, 454 (1985). The exception derived from political asylum,
a slightly older and different principle which provides sanctuary for those who are faced
with political persecution. Helton, supra note 30, at 459.
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anomalies and inconsistencies in American policy.62 Such criticism is
magnified when the anomaly results not from particular circumstances, but
from the United States government's deliberate attempt to avoid an
exception to expulsion.
A. The Political Offense Exception
The government's initial attempt to return Joseph Doherty to the
United Kingdom was blocked by the political offense exception.63
Although not explicitly defined in the treaty, the exception has been
developed through substantial case law.' The exception is fundamental
to the United States' extradition treaties. The exception is also deeply
rooted in the history of western democracy.' The overwhelming
majority of political offense cases67 and their corresponding commentar-
ies6" have dealt with the "complex" or "relative" political offense.'
62. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 30, at 458.
63. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
64. See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 37, at 177-87 (discussing the case development of
the political offense exception in international and United States law).
65. The United States currently has over one hundred bilateral extradition treaties with
foreign countries. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (listing current treaties).
Every treaty provides that extradition will not be granted where the offense is of a political
nature. Helton, supra note 30, at 457; see also, Note, supra note 61, at 450. But see
U.S.-U.K. Supplemental Treaty, supra note 25 (limiting the acts to which the political
offense exception applies). For explanation of the supplemental treaty's effect, see Helton,
supra note 30, at 471-75.
66. Article 120 of the French Jacobin Constitution of 1793 reflected the libertarian spirit
in its asylum provision applicable to those "exiled for the cause of freedom." The political
offense exception itself was formulated in Belgium in 1833. The Belgium provision stated
that no person "shall be punished for any political act connected to such a crime." It has
been adopted by most western democracies. Goldie, The Political Offense Exception and
Extradition Between Democratic States, 13 OHIO U. L. REv. 53, 59 (1986).
67. See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981) (member of PLO extradited for the bombing of an Israeli village square that killed
a number of civilians); Escobede v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980) (attempted kidnapping of Cuban counsel and the murder of
the assistant counsel); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (shooting of an
undercover British soldier found to be "incident" to his role in the PIRA); Ramos v. Diaz,
179 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D. Fla. 1959) (Cuban soldier sought for the murder of an
escaping communist prisoner).
68. See, e.g., Epps, The Validity of the Political Offense Exception in Extradition
Treaties in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61 (1979); Hannay,
International Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 381 (1980); Note, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political
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These offenses are troublesome because they involve elements of both
political and common crimes.' Although western democracies have
developed different methods of evaluating an act's political legitimacy,71
they uniformly acknowledge the exception's validity.'
The political offense exception has undergone various alterations in
response to criticism and changes in the international political environ-
ment. The modern development of the exception in the United States
consists of a three-prong test enunciated in the case In re Mackin:73
(1) whether a political uprising, revolution, rebellion, or
war was in existence at the time of the alleged
offense;
(2) whether the accused was a participant in the group
responsible for the uprising; and
(3) whether the alleged offense satisfied the Castioni
"incidental to" or "in furtherance" of the political
beliefs test. 74
Even this modern variation of the political offense exception,
however, has been criticized as an inadequate response to "complex"
political crimes.75
Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 654 (1986) (all proposing the abandonment of the
political offense exception).
69. Helton, supra note 30, at 460-61. The pure political offense acts directly against
the government and contains no elements of the common crime, e.g., treason, sedition and
espionage. The complex political offense contains elements of both, e.g., bank robbery to
finance anti-government activities. Id.
70. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 37, at 178.
71. French case law has responded with an objective test where the only question is
whether the act directly injures the target state. The Swiss have adopted a proportionality
test which evaluates the target and the proportional nature of the crime to its political
motives. The British test, enumerated in In re Castioni, [18411 1 Q.B. 149, questions
whether the act was "incident" to and part of a political disturbance. Goldie, supra note
66, at 62-67.
72. See generally Banoff & Pyle, supra note 37 (discussing the history and current
status of political offense exception in international law).
73. 668 F.2d 122 (1981) (Mackin was charged with the attempted murder of an
undercover British soldier.).
74. Id. at 125; see Castioni, I Q.B. 149.
75. See Helton, supra note 30, at 464 (exception cited as inadequate in response to
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The Doherty court abandoned the mechanical "incidence" test applied
in Mackin in favor of a balancing test it deemed more appropriate to the
modern threat of terrorism.76 In doing so, the court evaluated the nature
of the act,77 its objective, 7" the nature of the group the individual was
aligned with,' the individual's personal history,' the history of the
revolt s' and whether the act violated international law.' Despite its
stricter standard, the court found that Doherty's acts represented "the
political offense exception in the classic form."
8 3
terrorist acts); see also sources cited supra note 68.
76. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The court stated:
[wiere the Court persuaded that all that need be shown to sustain the political
offense exception is that there be a political conflict and that the offense be
committed during the course of and in the furtherance of that struggle, the
respondent would clearly be entitled to the benefits of that exception .. .[but]
such an approach is hardly consistent with either the realities of the modem
world, or the need to interpret the political offense exception in the light of the
lessons of recent history.
Id.
77. Id. at 275. The court noted that the act was not an indiscriminate bombing of
civilians or addressed at civilian or an act government representatives. Id. Rather, the acts
were targeted at the British military and, furthermore, it was the British military's response
to the situation which led to the battle and subsequent death. Id.
78. Id. Doherty and his other PIRA members were dispatched by PIRA leadership "'to
engage and attack' a convoy of British soldiers." Id. at 272.
79. Id. at 275. The court noted that the PIRA, although an offshoot of the traditional
IRA, had a discipline and command structure that parallels conventional military
organizations and distinguished it from amorphous terrorist groups such as the Black
Liberation Army or the Red Brigade. Id. at 276.
80. Id. at 275. Doherty's early exposure to oppression and adoption of republican
beliefs is related in his poem, text accompanying supra note I.
81. Id. at 273-74. The court first discussed the centuries old hatred and political
divisions which resulted from the British conquest of Ireland and noted that these
animosities were present in modern Ireland as well. Id. The court went on to note the
modem political climate in Ireland, the resurgence of the PIRA after the January 1972
incidents in Londonderry where thirteen civilians were killed by British paratroopers, the
escalation of violence between the PIRA and loyalist terrorist factions and the imposition
of martial law type conditions by the British including the creation of Diplock courts to try
political offenders and the military occupation of Londonderry and Belfast. Id. For a
detailed background on the history of the Northern Ireland conflict, see Myers, A New
Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping Intervention in
an Internal Conflict, II N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 9-31 (1990).
82. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275.
83. Id. at 276.
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B. Asylum and Withholding
Withholding and asylum are the political-humanitarian counterparts in
deportation to the political offense exception in extradition.8" An alien
is eligible for asylum if he or she can demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution.' Moreover, the attorney general must withhold deportation
when an alien's life or liberty is threatened by persecution."6 The recent
evolution of the asylum and withholding provisions demonstrates a
congressional intent to eliminate political considerations from the
deportation process.
Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980,"' asylum was granted on an ad hoc
basis, founded not on humanitarian concerns but on an ideological
aversion to communism. 8 During this period, asylum was explicitly tied
to ideology and limited to proof of actual or probable physical persecu-
fion. s9
The act was specifically intended to remove ideology from the
deportation process and thereby comply with the Refugee Convention and
Protocol.' The act's broader language, which prohibits exclusion of
"any person" who can demonstrate fear of persecution, demonstrates a
congressional intent to prohibit discrimination based on policy or
convenience. 9' The act makes withholding mandatory once the statute's
threshold criteria are met and, therefore, removes the attorney general's
84. Helton, supra note 30, at 475.
85. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Pirie, supra note 32, at 188-89
(discussing requirements for asylum and withholding).
86. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
87. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. (1986)).
88. From 1965 to 1980, refugee law quota systems resulted in 95% of the asylum grants
going to refugees from communist countries. See Note, supra note 61, at 458.
89. The purpose of the Displaced Persons Act, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), as
amended by Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (1950); Act of June 28, (1951),
ch. 167, 65 Stat. 96 (1951) (repealed 1957), was to aid persons fleeing fascist or Soviet
persecution. Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 868
n.22 (1980) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1980)); The Refugee Act of 1953, eh. 336,
67 Stat. 400 (1953), as amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, eh. 1169, 68 Stat. 1044 (1954),
served to expedite the admission of refugees from communist countries. Id. at 868. In
1952, "refugee" was defined to explicitly include people fleeing from communist countries.
Id. at 869; see also Cooper, supra note 57, at 924-27 (discussing bias in United States
refugee policy).
90. Cooper, supra note 57, at 930.
91. See, e.g., Kurzban, supra note 89.
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discretion with regard to withholding applications.'
In a brief of Amici Curiae,' members of the United States Congress
explain the purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 and its abuse in the
treatment of Joseph Doherty. The brief explains that the act eliminated
the dependence of asylum applicants on executive discretion by reestab-
lishing congressional influence in the deportation process.' Specifically,
it reaffirmed "the historic policy of the United States to respond to the
urgentness of persons subject to persecution . . . . "' The legislative
history of this act, which had broad bipartisan support,9 makes clear that
Congress adopted specific standards and procedures to prevent unfettered
executive discretion in the deportation process and bring the United States
into accord with international law. 97
The act limited "the executive branch's abuse of discretion"98 in four
ways. First, it adopted a non-political definition of refugee.' Second,
it created uniform procedures for asylum applications. " Third, it
removed the executive's discretion in applications for withholding. 1"'
Finally, Congress limited the executive's unfettered discretion in its use
of parole power."
These members of Congress assert that the government's treatment of
Joseph Doherty violates the act's clear mandate by denying Doherty a
hearing on asylum.' °3 In twenty years the attorney general has only
certified eight decisions of the BIA for review." In each instance the
review consisted of questions of law."°5 In Doherty, the attorney general
certified two decisions of the BIA, both times to overturn that tribunal's
92. See INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 1407 (1984).
93. Amicus Curiae Brief of Members of the United States Congress, Doherty v. INS,
908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989
Term).
94. Id. at 10.
95. id. (citing S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980)).
96. Id. at 4.
97. id. at 12.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 13.
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 16.
103. Id. at 17-22.
104. Id. at 21.
105. Id.
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factual findings."° These extraordinary actions reveal the government's
political motivation, the same political motivation Congress eliminated
from the immigration process by the Refugee Act of 1980.107
C. Modem Development of Asylum and Its Relationship to the
Political Offense Exception
The modern development of the asylum doctrine not only reflects its
new humanitarian focus, but it also highlights its relationship to the
political offense exception. An alien may not be deported to a country
where that alien's life or freedom would be jeopardized by persecution
unless the alien has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
United States.108 The definition of a non-political crime was addressed
by the BIA in In re Rodriguez-Palma, "o and by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in McMullen v. INS."'
In Rodriguez,"' the BIA looked to the Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" 2 (the
"Convention and Protocol") to define political offenses. The handbook
states that the offense should be political in nature and purpose, that is,
committed because of political motives and not for personal gain."'
Moreover, there should be a close causal link between the crime and the
individual's political goals," 4  with the crime's political element
outweighing its common law character." 5 Lastly, the act should not be
106. Id.
107. Id. ("Whatever foreign policy concerns the executive may have in Mr. Doherty's
case, Congress has explicitly made it clear that such concerns have no place in the asylum
determination. ").
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982); see 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(F)(1)(v) (1988).
109. 17 I&N Dee. 465 (BIA 1980).
110. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
111. Rodriguez arrived as part of the Mariel freedom flotilla. He applied for asylum
and withholding and admitted being convicted of drug trafficking in 1962 and robbery in
1968 and 1978. The immigration judge and BIA both ruled the acts were serious non-
political acts. 17 I&N Dec. 465 (BIA 1980).
112. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1979).
113. Id. 152, at 36.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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of an atrocious nature or disproportionate to its goals." 6
In McMullen v. INS, 117 the Ninth Circuit held that the Refugee Act
of 1980 was meant to be construed consistent with the Convention and
Protocol."I8  Although the court noted the similarities between the
Protocol's criteria for asylum and the political offense exception, it
declined to apply extradition's mechanistic analysis in the asylum context,
choosing instead a balancing test based on the nature of the act vis-a-vis
its political objective.' t9 While the court rejected the "incidence" test
and adopted a more flexible standard similar to that used in the Doherty
extradition for determining the political nature of an act,"2 it justified
its decision not on the inadequacy of traditional extradition analysis,
21
but on the difference between deportation and extradition. 22
These cases demonstrate the similar purpose and standards shared by
asylum and the political offense exception. In both contexts, an individual
can not be returned to a foreign country where the individual faces
punishment for a political crime. The standards developed to determine
whether a crime was a political act are similar, if not the same, and any
distinction results from the different situations addressed in the respective
proceedings.
D. The Illegitimacy of De Facto Extradition
The government's treatment of Joseph Doherty amounts to a de facto
extradition because the purpose, justification and result of the extradition
and deportation are identical. The deportation's conflict with the
116. Id.
117. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
118. Id. at 595.
119. Id. at 596 ("IT]he definition of the political offense exception although it may
serve as a guide, does not control our analysis of political offenses under section
243(h)(2)(e)."); see Helton, supra note 30, at 479 (analyzing the court's holding).
120. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
121. See generally sources cited supra note 68.
122. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 596.
Thus, the analysis in an extradition case turns on the language of the particular
treaty, while the political offense analysis in withholding of deportation cases
turns on a single standard-the Convention and Protocol. In addition, in contrast
to extradition, deportation is a matter solely between the United States
government and the individual seeking withholding of deportation. No other
sovereign is involved ...[ajll the United States seeks is to expel him from its
own borders. Thus, we find ourselves unencumbered by [concerns of extradi-
tion].
Id. (emphasis in original).
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procedure, substance and humanitarian exceptions designed by Congress
for the expulsion of aliens and accused criminals highlights its illegitima-
cy.
Extradition is the proper mechanism for returning an individual to a
foreign country for crimes committed there."2  Due to its criminal
nature and adverse effect on individual liberty, Congress has provided
procedural safeguards which ensure that the individual's rights are not
violated in the name of the United States government's diplomatic
interests. '2
Deportation, on the other hand, is ideologically neutral and is based
on humanitarian rather than political interests."z  Its purpose is to
protect domestic welfare and, therefore, does not permit the government
to justify deportation or specify the country of deportation based on
interests unrelated to domestic welfare." The alien has a substantive
right to designate the country of deportation unless the alien refuses to do
so or it is not possible to remove the alien to that country. 27
Furthermore, both deportation and extradition contain parallel
political-humanitarian exceptions to expulsion designed to ensure that the
individual is not subject to persecution. These exceptions prohibit
returning an individual to a country where he will suffer political
persecution.
The proper avenue for the United States to return Joseph Doherty the
PIRA fugitive to the United Kingdom is through extradition. In doing so,
however, the government must adhere to the criteria established by the
executive and legislative branches based on their evaluation of the best
interests of the United States. Attempting to deport Joseph Doherty the
illegal alien to the same country and for the same reason and rationale
rejected in the extradition of Doherty the fugitive, is an abuse and
misapplication of the immigration process. 128
123. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
126. The legitimacy of the political branches' plenary power is seriously undermined
when interests unrelated to its constitutional foundation are interjected.
127. 8 U.S.C. §1253(h) (1982); see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
128. Statements of government officials demonstrate that the crime addressed in the
extradition is the same basis for the deportation. Jay Scott Blackmun, assistant district
director of the INS, stated: "It's quite clear that in the extradition proceeding, the objective
was to get Doherty to the United Kingdom. And in the deportation proceeding, our
objective is to get him to the United Kingdom. This is just an alternative means to
accomplish that." 60 Minutes: Joe Doherty of the IRA (CBS television broadcast, Oct. i1,
1987) (transcript on file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.).
Furthermore, Mr. Blackmun stated that "the United States has taken a strong stance on
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The government's actions also violate the substantive criteria
contained in the Anglo-American extradition treaty which was in effect at
the time of Doherty's extradition proceeding. 129  In negotiating and
ratifying the extradition treaty with the United Kingdom, the legislative
and executive branches necessarily considered the interests of the United
States in determining what crimes would be extraditable. The treaty in
question contained the political offense exception," which although not
explicitly defined in that treaty has been developed through a substantial
body of case law. 131
At the time of Joseph Doherty's extradition proceeding, the political
offense exception was intensely criticized as an inadequate and antiquated
doctrine.132 Twice Congress considered, but failed to enact, a statute to
address these concerns. 33  The executive branch began negotiating a
controversial supplemental treaty with the United Kingdom" 4 designed
to limit the political offense exception, but it had not been implemented at
the time of Doherty's extradition proceeding. 35  The district court did,
terrorism. It would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States to permit a member
of a terrorist organization to leave the U.S. and travel to a country where he might escape
punishment for his crimes." U.S. Refuses to Deport LR.A. Member, supra note 15, at 3,
col. 1. This reference is an attempt to deprive Mr. Doherty of his legal rights as an Irish
citizen. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
129. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 7. But see U.S.-U.K. Supplemental
Treaty, supra note 25 (limiting the political offense exception). At this time Joseph
Doherty may be subject to the supplemental treaty. Although not in effect at the time of
Doherty's extradition, this treaty purports to be retroactive. See Helton, supra note 30, at
433 n. 114 (describing the legality of retroactive application of treaty provisions).
130. Article V of the treaty provides:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted if:
(c)(i)the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded as one of
a political nature.
U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 7, art. V.
131. See sources cited supra note 67.
132. See sources cited supra note 66.
133. See S. 1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (proposed new section 3194(e)(1) of
title 18 of the U.S.C.), reprinted in S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 130 CONG.
REC. H9242 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1984) (proposed new section 3194(e)(9"2) of title 18 of the
U.S.C.). For explanation of the proposal's effect on exception, see Helton, supra note 30,
at 469-71.
134. The United States government began redefining the political offense exception on
a treaty-by-treaty basis in 1985. Helton, supra note 30, at 459. The first treaty approved
by Congress was the supplemental treaty. Id.
135. Although the timing of the ratification may be irrelevant because of the treaty's
retroactive nature, Helton, supra note 30, at 471-75, it takes on added significance in light
of the government's actions which this Note demonstrates are illegitimate. Furthermore,
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however, adopt a stricter test in the Doherty extradition designed to
address the inadequacy of the exception which Doherty's acts fulfilled "in
the classic form.""
The government is attempting to accomplish what Congress specifical-
ly chose not to do, the executive failed to do and the Doherty court did do
but with a different result. This substitution for congressional judgment
and defiance of a judicial holding, ' even if ultimately unsuccessful, has
effectively stripped Joseph Doherty of the constitutional rights accorded
aliens present in the United States13 and of his substantive and proce-
dural rights under the applicable treaties and statutes.
Lastly, the government ignores the purpose of, and relationship
between, the political offense exception and asylum. An alien may not be
deported to a country where the individual faces persecution139 unless
the individual has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
United States. 1" Even though the McMullen court refused to grant res
judicata effect to the political offense exception in an asylum hearing, 4"
Joseph Doherty's acts independently satisfy the McMullen test. This is not
there is evidence that the government's actions amount to delay tactics designed to ensure
that Doherty will be returned to the United Kingdom. For instance, the "prejudicial"
standard has never been used, even with regard to Nazi war criminals. See Brief for
Petitioner at 93, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-4084, 1988 Term;
renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
136. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
137. The only method to "appeal" a ruling blocking extradition is to file another
extradition. See supra note 9. The government's requested declaratory judgement was
rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which commented that the administration
"fear[s] it may lose when it tries again." United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). The government chose not to file a writ of certiorari or another
extradition request, instead resorting to the immigration process where it would retain
control.
138. For an analysis of the constitutional rights of aliens see, United States ex rel.
Aceardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Bridges v. Wixon, 362 U.S. 135 (1945);
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (aliens who have "entered" the United States
are entitled to constitutional protection of due process); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024,
1030 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986) (aliens who have effected entry
into country, whether lawfully or not, are accorded full panoply of traditional due process
rights); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (1 lth Cir. 1983); see also Martin, Due Process
and the Treatment of Aliens. Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PiTr. L. REv. 165 (1983). But see Alcinkoff, Aliens,
Due Process and 'Community lies': A Response to Martin, 44 U. PiTr L. REV. 237
(1983).
139. See supra notes 84-107 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
141. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 596.
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a surprise given the similarities between the McMullen test and the test
applied by the district court in the Doherty extradition.'42 There are
numerous distinctions between McMullen and Doherty which demonstrate
that Doherty's acts, unlike McMullen's, are political and therefore should
bar his deportation to the United Kingdom.
In McMullen, the acts that were the basis of the extradition attempt
were unrelated to McMullen's subsequent claim of persecution in the
deportation proceeding.'43 While McMullen's extradition was blocked
because the court found his acts against the United Kingdom political in
nature,'" his subsequent claim of persecution in the deportation proceed-
ing derived not from the government of the United Kingdom, but from the
PIRA because of McMullen's informant activities for the United States
and British governments.' 45  The court, therefore, distinguished
extradition from deportation because the deportation proceeding did not
interfere with the internal political affairs of the host country.'
In contrast, the government claims in the Doherty matter that the
diplomatic interests of the United States will be endangered if the United
States does not help the United Kingdom combat its internal political
insurrection by returning Doherty to the United Kingdom.'47  Direct
consideration of the internal interests of the United Kingdom, as well as
the diplomatic interests of the United States, is inconsistent with the
McMullen court's view that deportation involves the exclusion of an
undesirable alien and not interference with the internal affairs of a foreign
country.
The second major distinction between the Doherty and McMullen
cases is apparent from the McMullen court's definition and application of
its asylum standard. The court held that the Refugee Act of 1980 adopted
the Convention and Protocol and, therefore, asylum need not be granted
for serious non-political offenses.' 48  The court noted the difficulties in
142. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
143. McMullen was convicted and served three years for participation in PIRA
activities. Upon his release, he initially refused, but eventually was coerced, to aid in
training and smuggling for PIRA activities. He then fled to the United States where he
cooperated with United States and United Kingdom officials in hopes of gaining asylum.
After gaining the benefit of McMullen's information, the United Kingdom sought
extradition but was unsuccessful. The United States then sought to deport McMullen to his
home in the United Kingdom. McMullen claimed that returning to the United Kingdom
would result in retaliation from the PIRA. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 593.
144. Id.
145. id.
146. Id. at 596.
147. See sources cited supra note 128.
148. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 594-95; see also supra notes 109-22 and accompanying
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defining terrorist acts as political or nonpolitical,"' but then concentrat-
ed on one criteria that justified its characterization of McMullen's acts as
non-political.
In finding McMullen's acts non-political, the court concentrated on his
indirect participation in the murder of civilians who opposed the PIRA.
According to the court, McMullen's acts were non-political because "the
random acts of violence against the ordinary civilians of Northern Ireland
and elsewhere are not sufficiently linked to their political objectives and,
by virtue of their primary targets, so barbarous, atrocious and dispropor-
tional to their objective that they constitute, 'serious nonpolitical
crimes.'" 15
As the district court noted in Doherty, Joseph Doherty's acts were
aimed directly at the British military and did not involve civilian
targets.5 ' Moreover, the acts were carried out in a conventional
military manner"5 2 and did not constitute "random acts against the
ordinary citizens intended to promote social chaos."153
Doherty's acts, unlike McMullen's, demonstrate the convergence
rather than the divergence of the political offense exception and asylum.
In the final analysis, the government's de facto extradition ignores the
distinctive functions of deportation and extradition, as well as the
similarities between the political offense exception and asylum.
Even if the technical distinction between section 1253 and the Refugee
Act of 1980 prevail over the substance and overall purpose of deportation,
the language of section 1253 does not justify deporting Joseph Doherty to
the United Kingdom for his alleged crime.
V. SECTION 1253 As A DEPARTURE CONTROL
The "prejudicial" provision in 8 U.S.C. section 1253 is a form of
departure control. The term "departure control" describes specific
statutory provisions that allow the government to restrict an individual's
departure from the United States.154 The government contends that the
"prejudicial" provision of section 1253 gives the attorney general power
(based on United States interests) to override Doherty's substantive right
text; Helton, supra note 30, at 479 (discussing effect of McMullen court's ruling).
149. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 595.
150. Id. at 598.
151. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
152. See supra note 5.
153. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272.
154. Note, Alien Departure Control-A Safeguard for Both the Exercise of Findanental
Human Rights and National Security, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 159 (1987).
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to choose his country of deportation. '55 In this respect, it constitutes a
form of departure control and conceivably may provide a legal basis for
returning Joseph Doherty to the United Kingdom. An analysis of the
constitutional limits and statutory purpose of departure controls demon-
strates, however, that section 1253 does not justify returning Doherty to
the United Kingdom.
As the history and case law addressing departure controls is
sparse,"s their purpose and constitutional limits are unclear. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has developed basic rules of construction and
constitutional limits pertaining to the control of individuals departing from
the United States. In Kent v. Dulles,'57 the Court held that the Passport
Act, 5 ' which prohibited the use of a passport by a communist in
furtherance of the communist movement, '59 did not permit the secretary
of state to deny a passport to a communist travelling to a communist
convention. The Court stated that the secretary's broad power over
passport authorization was not a grant of unbridled discretion and must be
narrowly construed absent clear congressional intent to the contrary,
congressional acquiescence or a national emergency, such as a war.'6°
Moreover, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,'61 the Court narrowly
construed the Subversive Activities Act 62 so as to ensure that the act
served a "legitimate end and did not unduly infringe on individual
freedoms."" 6 While avoiding constitutional issues, these cases demon-
strate the need to limit executive discretion and protect individual rights
by narrowly construing departure controls.
In Zemel v. Rusk,"6 the Court addressed the constitutional limits of
departure controls when it upheld the denial of a Cuban passport
application. The Court reasoned that the restriction was constitutionally
valid because of the strained cold war relations between the two countries
155. Brief for Respondent at 28-49, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1989)
(No. 88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
156. See generally Note, supra note 154.
157. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
158. Passport Act of 1926, ch. 772, 44 Stat. 887 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 211(a)
(1982)).
159. 22 C.F.R. 51.135 (1957).
160. Kent, 357 U.S. at 127-29.
161. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
162. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 6, 64 Stat. 987,
993 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 787 (1982)).
163. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 509 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940)).
164. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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which gave rise to the "weightiest concerns of national security." 65 In
Haig v. Agee," the standard was further refined as a "likelihood of
serious damage to the national security or foreign policy." 67 There, the
Court upheld the revocation of the passport of a former CIA agent who
had declared "war" on the CIA and promised to reveal the identities of
foreign operatives. 1  Finally, in Regan v. Wald,"W the court permit-
ted restriction of business-related travel to Cuba, pursuant to the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations,"7 because United States relations with Cuba
were in a state of emergency and the money involved would be used to
support communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere.171
The standards of narrowly construing departure controls, and
requiring a likelihood of serious damage to the national security to justify
their implementation, are also fundamental principles of international
law." n International law principles dictate, and scholars point out, that
departure controls must be implemented only when necessary to address
pressing, immediate and serious public needs, subject to more than
administrative or executive action and accompanied by procedures which
limit governmental discretion. 1" In the 1972 Uppsala Conference, 74
a declaration was adopted 75 stating that a restriction must be "necessary
to prevent a clear and present danger to national security or public order
...and only if such limitations are provided for by law, are clear and
specific, are not subject to arbitrary application and do not destroy [ I
substan[tive] [ ] rights."176 These standards apply to both aliens and
citizens under international law. 1
The scope of the United States government's alien departure controls
165. Id. at 16.
166. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
167. Haig, 453 U.S. at 306.
168. Id.
169. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
170. 40 Stat. 411, as amended 50 U.S.C. app. § I et seq.
171. Regan, 468 U.S. at 243 (quoting United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).
172. H. HANNIUN, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 122 (1987).
173. Note, supra note 154, at 167.
174. This report, compiled in Uppsala, Sweden, describes the historical and philosophi-
cal right to leave and the right to leave in various countries. Id. at 170-72.
175. Uppsala Colloquium, The Right to Leave and Return, reprinted in K. VASAK &
L. SKOFSKY, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN 164 (1976).
176. Id. at 170.
177. Id. at 164.
[Vol. I I
DEPORTATION OR EXTRADITION JOSEPH DOHERTY
is less clear. 7  While there are few cases on point, 179 history demon-
strates that serious threats to national security have normally accounted for
the imposition of such restrictions. In response to World Wars I and II,
various controls were implemented to restrict alien departure.18 During
the Korean conflict, President Truman issued two presidential proclama-
tions which limited the freedom of aliens.' These restrictions were
primarily intended to prevent the transfer of technical information received
by aliens through education and training received in the United States."8 2
In 1987, United States authorities prevented former Philippine president
Ferdinand Marcos from leaving the United States because he had allegedly
purchased weapons and chartered a flight to the Philippines for the
purpose of overthrowing the Aquino government.
83
Marcos was detained based on 8 C.F.R. section 215,184 which has
language similar to section 1253 and allows the government to prevent an
alien from leaving the United States if his departure is deemed "prejudi-
cial to the interests of the United States. "85 Departures which are
considered "prejudicial" are set forth in five categories" 6 which contain
substantial procedural protection designed to restrict executive discretion
178. Id. at 183.
179. The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of alien departure control, although
an alien's right to depart was recognized in Han-Lee Mao v. Brownwell, 207 F.2d 142
(D.C. Cir. 1953).
180. Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252 (1941) (repealed 1952); Act of May
22, 1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559 (1918) (amended 1941) (repealed 1952). Controls placed
on all persons of Japanese ancestry during World War 11 were upheld in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see Firabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
see also Note, supra note 154, at 184 n. 161.
181. Proclamation No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489 (1953); Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed.
Reg. 9029 (1950); see Note, supra note 154, at 185 n.162.
182. Note, supra note 154, at 185. Arthur Helton, director of the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, believes section 1253(h) was intended to serve the same purpose. See
U.S. Refuses to Deport I.R.A. Member, supra note 15, at 3, col. 1.
183. Note, supra note 154, at 159-60.
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (1982) authorizes the president to control an individuals
entry or departure. The corresponding regulations are Controls of Aliens Deporting from
the United States, 8 C.F.R. § 215 (1987) (Justice Department), and 22 C.F.R. § 46 (1987)
(State Department).
185. Note, supra note 154, at 184-86 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 184. Departure is prejudicial when: I) departure would adversely effect
national security; 2) the alien is subject to registration in the armed forces of the United
States; 3) the alien is implicated in legal proceedings; 4) the alien is leaving the country
involuntarily (this humanitarian provision protects aliens who are being forced by their own
country to return); and (5) similar cases not explicitly covered in the preceding provisions.
Id.
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and protect the individual. The most important of these categories
addresses the adverse effect the individual will have on national securi-
ty.87 Restriction is authorized where an alien is likely to either: 1)
disclose information concerning the national defense;. 2) engage in
activities against the defense of the United States,'8 9 United Nations"o
or an ally;'' 3) participate in any insurrection in the United States or in
the territory of an ally;"2 or, 4) have technical training that an enemy
could use to undermine military operations of the United States or an
ally. "0
It is unclear whether the restriction of an alien must also be justified
by a likelihood of serious damage to national security or foreign policy.
Although under international law the standard is the same for citizens and
aliens," 9 United States law has generally limited the rights of aliens. 5
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that upon entrance into the
United States aliens are entitled to constitutional protection and the
substantive rights granted them by Congress under statute."9  In the
context of deportation, aliens have a substantive right to designate their
country of deportation and apply for asylum.9 7 For these reasons, the
same standard should be applied to aliens departing pursuant to deportation
and citizens departing of their own free will.
Joseph Doherty's acts do not satisfy the criteria for instituting a
departure control.' 8 Doherty does not pose a threat to the national
defense of an ally because he has renounced his membership to the
PIRA"o and faces incarceration and possible extradition to the United
187. 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(a) (1987); 22 C.F.R. § 46.3(a) (1987).
188. 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(a); 22 C.F.R. § 46.3(a).
189. 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(b); 22 C.F.R. § 46.3(b).
190. 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(b); 8 C.F.R. § 46.3(b).
191. 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(c); 8 C.F.C. § 46.3(c).
192. 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(d); 8 C.F.R. § 46.3(d).
193. 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(i); 22 C.F.R. § 46.3(i).
194. Note, supra note 154, at 165.
195. See Martin, supra note 138. Different standards of constitutional protection are
accorded depending on an alien's status within the United States. Id.
196. Aliens who have "entered" the United States are entitled to constitutional
protection. Landon v. Plasencia, 454 U.S. 21 (1982).
197. See supra note 16; see also Yiu Sung Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1983)
(the right to apply for political asylum also implicates substantive rights, as well as rights
under the United States Constitution).
198. See supra notes 154-93 and accompanying text.
199. Blake, Judge Eyes Bail for Ex-IRA Member; Fugitive from Ulster Has Been Held
for Seven Years in New York Jail, Boston Globe, Sept. 5, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
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Kingdom even if he is deported to the Republic of Ireland.'t Nor is
there evidence that Doherty or any member of the PIRA constitute a threat
to the welfare or security of the United States. The government's
justification, therefore, is not based on the national security of an ally, but
on a desire to protect United States diplomatic relations with the United
Kingdom and its reputation in the international community.2"' These
motivations do not justify the imposition of restrictions under 8 U.S.C.
section 1185. In addition, and it is doubtful that 8 U.S.C. section 1253
provides a broader basis for control.
The use of identical language in sections 1253 and 1185 indicates their
similar purposes. Nothing in section 1253 indicates that a lower standard
is to be applied to the control of an alien's deportation. The inclusion of
the same provision in sections 1185 and 1253 simply reflects the
distinctive situations addressed by each provision. Section 1185 allows the
government to restrict travel of those who are attempting to leave the
United States of their own volition.' Section 1253, on the other hand,
deals with individuals being deported. The inclusion of the "prejudicial"
standard was a way of insuring that an alien's choice under section 1253
would not pose any of the dangers protected against under section
1185. m3
The government is attempting to expand the scope of the "prejudicial"
language in section 1253, an ambiguous and never before used provision,
beyond that of section 1185.' The ambiguity of the statute's language
as well as a lack of congressional intent205 or acquiescence-6 on the
200. Under article two of the Irish Constitution, the Republic consists of the whole of
Ireland, North and South. Finucane v. The Governor of Portlaoise Prison, No. 164/89,
slip op. at 13 (Ir. S.C. Mar. 13, 1990). Article three provides that until reunification, the
Irish legislature (Oireachtas) may allow for extrajudicial prosecution of certain offences.
Id. at 14. Those offenses that may be prosecuted are the ones most commonly occurring
under the political offense exception. Id. Under this scheme, the Republic will provide
extrajudicial prosecution for crimes committed in the North if the United Kingdom requests
such prosecution. Id. Therefore, the United Kingdom can request Doherty's extradition
from the Republic of Ireland and if unsuccessful can request prosecution within the
Republic. Extrajudicial prosecution has been conspicuously more successful in securing
conviction of fugitive offenders of politically motivated crimes. Campbell, Extradition to
Northern Ireland: Prospects and Problems, 52 MOD. L. REV. 585 (1989).
201. See supra note 128.
202. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
204. Supra note 15.
205. See generally 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4700; see also Pub. L.
96-212, 1980, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 141; Pub. L. 97-116,
1981, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2577.
206. Rather than congressional acquiescence, the government's actions have resulted in
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subject demands a narrow construction of this clause equivalent to that
given section 1185. The extraordinary power and potential for abuse
inherent in the attorney general's interpretation of section 1253 is precisely
what the Supreme Court tried to prevent in its rulings on departure
controls.' This use is also contrary to the international standard which
mandates "more than simple administrative or executive action . . .
accompanied by procedures to limit executive discretion. " '
Joseph Doherty does not pose a serious threat to the security of the
United States or the United Kingdom. Doherty is a citizen of the Republic
of Ireland and the Republic has agreed to accept him if deported
there.' If Doherty is deported to the Republic of Ireland he still faces
trial and incarceration for his "crime" because the Irish Constitution
allows extrajudicial prosecution for crimes committed in Northern
Ireland.21 Furthermore, the broadness of the government's position
demonstrates its inconsistency. The government contends that deportation
to any country other than the United Kingdom would prejudice the
interests of the United States.21" ' If this position were truly based on the
criteria for departure control, then Joseph Doherty would necessarily pose
a threat to the United Kingdom even if deported to Siberia. The
government's actions leave no doubt that section 1253 is not being used
as a security device but as an affirmative tool of foreign policy.
There are also two independent reasons why the use of departure
control in the Doherty context is inappropriate. First, it is not being used
to prevent an individual from leaving the United States; it is being used
to return an individual to a country where he faces persecution. Second,
the control overrides numerous administrative and judicial decisions which
have unanimously held that it is improper to return Doherty to the United
Kingdom. In reality, the government is not protecting the United
Kingdom from a security risk, it is protecting the United Kingdom from
the laws of the Republic of Ireland. Attorney General Meese bluntly
stated, "it is in our interest that [the petitioner] be sent directly to the
United Kingdom" because "deporting him to Ireland would require the
United Kingdom to invoke Irish law to secure [his return] to the United
Kingdom."212 In exercising his substantive right to designate the
a proposed congressional resolution and an Amicus Curiae brief opposing the government's
treatment of Joseph Doherty.
207. See supra notes 156-71 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 10.
210. See supra note 200.
211. Matter of Doherty, Mem. Att'y Gen. (June 9, 1988).
212. Id.
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country of deportation, Doherty is not attempting to escape punishment or
carry on his fight against the English occupation; he simply wants his case
heard and his sentence served in his own country. Doherty fears
the treatment he would receive as a known republican whose
devotion to the republican cause has made him a subject of
special antipathy to security forces ... . Once entombed within
the famous Long Kesh [Maze] prison and at the total disposal of
the government he has opposed . . . since his teenage years Mr.
Doherty fears not the punishment of life imprisonment but rather
inhuman and degrading treatment, beatings, torture, and perhaps
even death. 23
The government has attempted to ensure throughout this proceeding
that Doherty will not be able to use these fears in his defense either in the
United States or in the Republic of Ireland.
If Doherty had been deported when he first waived his asylum hearing
and agreed to deportation, he may have been able to invoke the political
offense exception to the Irish Extradition Act of 1965.24 By invoking
the prejudicial provision of section 1253 and refusing to abide by judicial
and administrative decisions, however, the government kept Doherty in
the United States until the new Irish extradition law, which effectively
eliminated the exception as it applied to Doherty, became operative.25
This delay has also subjected Doherty to the supplemental Anglo-American
extradition treaty which also eliminated the political offense exception
from the treaty. 216 These facts demonstrate the true de facto nature of
the government's actions. Even if Doherty eventually prevails in the
United States and is sent to the Republic of Ireland, he faces extradition
under the new Irish extradition law. Recent decisions by the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Ireland, however, indicate not only that
Doherty's fears accurately depict treatment of Republican prisoners in the
prisons of the United Kingdom, but also that despite the new Irish
extradition law, deporting Doherty to the Republic of Ireland probably will
allow Doherty to avoid that abuse.
In its March 13, 1990 decisions, Finucane v. Governor of Portlaoise
213. Brief for Petitioner at 64-65, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (No.
88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term).
214. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
215. Irish Extradition Act of 1987, supra note 10.
216. Article 4 of the Supplemental Treaty eliminated, for all practical purposes, the
political offense exception to extradition with retroactive effect. See supra note 25; see
also Helton, supra note 30, at 471-75 (listing and analyzing the provisions of the
supplemental treaty).
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Prison. 7 and Clarke v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison,21 the Irish
Supreme Court denied extradition of two members of the IRA who had
escaped from Long Kesh [Maze] prison. Although the cases concerned
extradition under the Irish Extradition Act of 1965,219 the court based
its decision on article 40 of the Irish Constitution.' The court held that
returning the petitioners to English custody would violate their constitu-
tional rights because it would subject them to the "probable risk, that
[they] would be assaulted or injured by the illegal acts of the prison
staff.""' The court based this holding on its finding of systemic abuse
of republican prisoners in English custody and a refusal by the prison
system to discipline prison officials or reform its treatment of republican
prisoners.' The court affirmed its position on April 6, 1990, when it
refused to extradite Owen Carron, an alleged member of the IRA, based
again on the Irish Constitution. Thus, even if the United Kingdom
requests extradition under the new Irish extradition law, his extradition
may very well be blocked by the Irish Constitution.'
217. No. 164-89, slip op. (Ir. S.C. Mar. 13, 1990).
218. No. 304-89, slip op. (It. S.C. Mar. 13, 1990).
219. Supra note 12; cf. the case of Desmond Ellis, the first person extradited to Britain
from Ireland under the Irish Extradition Act of 1987. Ryder, Dublin Judges Hand Over
IRA Bombs Suspect, Daily Telegraph (London), Nov. 15, 1990, at 11, col. 1; IRA Suspect
Is Extradited to London for Bombing Tial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1990, at AI0, col. 6.
220. Finucane, No. 164-89, at 3 (Walsh, J.).
221. Id. at 9.
222. The Court based its decision on events surrounding a 1983 mass escape from the
Long Kesh [Maze] prison. During this escape, which involved close to two hundred
prisoner's a British guard died of a heart attack. After the grounds were secured, prison
officials transferred the remaining republican prisoners to a different block in order to
conduct a search of the grounds. The guards were ordered to remove police dogs from the
prisoner's path and initially did so. After the minister, however, left the prisoners were
attacked by the guards and dogs. Despite serious injuries to prisoners, prison officials
refused medical treatment for a number of days in memory of the deceased guard. The
guard had died of a heart attack. When the Bureau of Prisons attempted an investigation
it was met with a wall of silence and written documentation denying any abuse or denial
of medical treatment. Prison officials testified at numerous cases brought by prisoners that
no such actions took place and that there was no conspiracy. The prisoners lost most of
theses cases. Documents which were uncovered, however, revealed a systemic cover-up.
Despite written and testimonial evidence that no abuses of prisoners occurred, these
documents proved that prisoners were in fact attacked by dogs and guards and were denied
medical treatment for up to ten days. Although the government has offered monetary
settlements for some prisoners, it has not instituted an investigation, disciplinary
proceedings or reform although most of the guards remain in service at the Long-Kesh
prison. Id.
223. Prokeseh, Court Counters Irish Policy on Extraditions to Britain, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 7, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
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Clearly, Joseph Doherty's acts do not satisfy the criteria for departure
control. Therefore, there is no basis for returning him to the United
Kingdom other than the fact that he is wanted by an ally for a crime
committed in that country. This amounts to an illegitimate de facto
extradition. The government's actions render meaningless three separate
statutory mechanisms (extradition, deportation and departure controls),
strip Joseph Doherty of his procedural and substantive rights and
circumvent the legal system of the Republic of Ireland," 4 which Joseph
Doherty is a citizen.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The government's use of deportation to accomplish what was properly
addressed and prohibited in extradition ignores the distinct purposes of
these two mechanisms. It also ignores both mechanism's political-
humanitarian exceptions to expulsion. The government has attempted to
serve the very political interests Congress explicitly excluded from
deportation and the judiciary prohibited in extradition.
The diplomatic interests of the United States, while arguably
important, do not rise to the level of national emergency. Therefore,
Doherty's return to the United Kingdom cannot be justified as a valid
exercise of departure control. Most departure controls limit an indivi-
dual's freedom by forcing him to remain in the United States. In contrast,
the government is using section 1253 to remove Doherty from the United
States to a country where he faces physical persecution. While the United
Kingdom is possibly our staunchest ally, the United States cannot ignore
the abuse of republican prisoners by the United Kingdom as documented
by the Irish Supreme Court and various international agencies, and
experienced by Doherty personally.
224. Whether Doherty would be imprisoned or extradited once in the Republic of
Ireland has been uncertain throughout this proceeding. What was certain was that Doherty
faced a 10-year sentence in the Republic if he did block extradition to the United Kingdom.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Prior to the implementation of the Irish
Extradition Act of 1987, supra note 10, Doherty possibly could have blocked extradition
based on the Irish political exception which was a question of law to be decided by Irish
courts. Brief for Petitioner at 69 n.37, Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990)
(No. 88-4084, 1988 Term; renumbered No. 89-4092, 1989 Term) (citing McGlinchey v.
Wren, [19821 I.R. 154; [19831 I.LR.M. 169). The implementation of the new extradition
law removed the issue from the courts and specifically prohibited acts which included
automatic weapons. Id.
225. Doherty is a citizen of both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. He
is recognized by the Republic as its citizen and was assured that the Republic would accept
his deportation.
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To return Joseph Doherty to the United Kingdom based on diplomatic
expedience would compromise this country's traditional role as a refuge
from persecution and as guarantor of fundamental rights.
Michael J. Bowe
